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This paper develops an empirical model of the cross-country variation in bilateral 
output growth correlations for 17 OECD countries. Consideration is given to the 
role played by explicit mechanisms for transmitting shocks between countries, 
such as trade in goods and financial assets and the coordination of monetary policy 
between countries. In addition we identify a number of country characteristics and 
institutions (including measures of legal origin, accounting standards, and the 
speed of take-up of new technology) that appear to lead countries to respond 
similarly to economic shocks. Both transmission mechanisms and common country 
characteristics have a role to play in explaining output correlations.  
When we use our empirical results to help to explain the strong correlation 
observed between Australian and US output growth, we conclude that trade 
between the two countries is not sufficiently important to account for much of the 
correlation. Nor does the similarity of monetary policies make much of a 
contribution. Our results instead suggest that it is the similarity of economic 
characteristics and institutions that explains much of the observed correlation 
between Australian and US output growth. 
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UNDERSTANDING OECD OUTPUT CORRELATIONS 
Glenn Otto, Graham Voss and Luke Willard 
1. Introduction 
While business cycles appear to have been relatively closely synchronized across 
the major industrial countries over most of this period (the past  25 years), 
they have been less so recently. This can be explained by the dominant role of 
global shocks in driving economic fluctuations in the 1970s and 1980s, with 
country-specific circumstances playing a larger role in recent years. (IMF 1998)  
The strong correlation between the growth of Australian and US GDP over the last 
two decades is well documented and has been the subject of considerable 
research.1 The precise reasons for this relationship, however, are not fully 
understood. Although the extent of Australia’s integration with the US economy is 
substantial, it is no greater in some directions than with other countries. Most 
obviously, Australia has stronger trading links with Japan yet there is much less 
correlation between the Australian and Japanese business cycle than that between 
Australia and the US. This suggests that what underlies common economic cycles 
may be quite complex and the purpose of this paper is to explore this issue.  
Rather than focus on the relationship between two particular economies, this paper 
examines common cycles more generally by considering a reasonably large set of 
industrialised economies and the many bilateral relationships and economic 
interdependencies that such a set of countries provides. The advantage of this 
approach is that it provides conclusions that are more general than those of specific 
country studies.  
There is a good deal of empirical research that indicates a high degree   
of synchronisation of business cycles between industrialised economies   
(for example, see Gerlach (1988); Backus and Kehoe (1992); Baxter (1995); 
                                           
1  See, for example, Dungey and Pagan (2000); de Brouwer and Romalis (1996); de Roos and 
Russell (1996); Debelle and Preston (1995) and Gruen and Shuetrim (1994). 2 
 
 
Canova and Marrinan (1998)). There is much less agreement on the reason for the 
synchronisation of cycles. The empirical observation can be interpreted as 
evidence of considerable interdependencies between these economies, through 
trade in goods or assets, which cause country or region specific shocks to spill 
through the international economy. It may also be interpreted as evidence   
of common shocks driving the business cycles of the industrialised   
economies (Stockman 1988; Gregory, Head and Raynauld 1995; Kose, Otrok and 
Whiteman 1999). Of course, neither of these explanations precludes the other and 
one of the objectives of this study is to see to what extent it is possible to 
discriminate between these different explanations in the data. 
The majority of existing empirical studies have largely focused of the time series 
dimension of the data. However in this study we use the time series variation in the 
data to estimate bilateral cross-correlations and consequently confine our analysis 
to explaining the cross-country variation in the data. There are a number of other 
studies that have also pursued analyses similar to this paper.2 Two of these focus 
on the importance of bilateral trade in goods as an explanation of the observed 
common cycles, Canova and Dellas (1993) and Frankel and Rose (1998).3 Both of 
these conclude that the extent of bilateral trade, variously measured, is an 
important causal factor underlying the co-movement of business cycles. Trade is 
obviously an important transmission mechanism between two economies in theory 
and these studies confirm this empirically. However, trade in goods cannot be the 
complete story – witness Australia and the US – and both of these studies tend to 
confirm this as well; while trade is a statistically significant explanation, it explains 
relatively little. 
Imbs (2000) focuses instead on the common structure, in terms of employment in 
manufacturing industries, of any two economies as an explanation for the   
co-movement of the business cycle. In this case, the driving force underlying 
                                           
2   See Canova and Dellas (1993); Frankel and Rose (1998); Clark and van Wincoop (1999) and 
Imbs (2000).  
3   Canova and Dellas (1993) have a similar objective to this paper. Frankel and Rose (1998), in 
contrast, are concerned with a slightly different issue, whether or not highly correlated 
business cycles, a criteria for participation in a common currency, are a function of the extent 
of trade. If so, then participation in a common currency, by increasing trade, is likely to 
ensure that participating countries have highly correlated business cycles.  3 
 
 
common cyclical behaviour is common shocks; if two economies have similar 
economic structures, then they will respond in a similar fashion. 
This paper extends the work of these earlier studies in a number of ways. First, we 
seek to develop a coherent framework for this type of empirical study. Second, we 
consider a broader range of transmission channels, including financial integration 
and policy influences, in an attempt to get a better characterisation of the forces 
underlying the synchronisation of business cycles. Finally, we also examine a 
wider range of economic characteristics that might explain why economies respond 
in a similar fashion to common shocks or why certain economies may be more 
closely integrated than others. 
1.1  Bilateral Correlations of GDP Growth 
Before proceeding further, it is helpful to have an informal look at the data that we 
examine, the bilateral correlations of GDP growth for a set of industrialised 
countries.  
We consider 17 OECD countries for which we were able to obtain a consistent set 
of data: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,   
United Kingdom and United States. This provides 136 country pairs, which form 
the basis of our analysis. For a particular sample, we calculate the bilateral 
correlations of four-quarter-ended real GDP growth.4 Initially, we consider   
three different time periods: the full sample 1960:Q1–2000:Q4, and two   
sub-samples, 1960:Q1–1979:Q4 and 1980:Q1–2000:Q4. Table 1 reports some 
summary statistics for these correlations calculated over these different samples. 
                                           
4   We focus on growth rates of GDP as our means of identifying common cycles in the 
economies we consider. Growth rates have the advantage of being a natural measure of how 
economies perform over the cycle; however, they are not the only means of describing the 
business cycle and, in fact, they may be a poor measure of the business cycle for a variety of 
technical reasons, see Baxter and King (1995). Nonetheless, we believe that growth rates 
provide a reasonable and natural measure of the business cycle that is sufficient for our 
purposes. Some support for this is provided by Frankel and Rose (1998), who consider a 
variety of different means of detrending the GDP data, including four-quarter-ended growth 




Table 1: GDP Growth Rate Correlations 
Four-quarter-ended growth rates 
   1960:Q1–1979:Q4  1980:Q1–2000:Q4  1960:Q1–2000:Q4 
All countries        
Mean   0.31  0.27  0.33 
Minimum   –0.22  –0.37  –0.07 
Maximum   0.72 0.85  0.75 
English-speaking countries       
Mean   0.31  0.52  0.42 
Minimum   0.03 0.22  0.18 
Maximum   0.70 0.85  0.75 
Notes:  Statistics are calculated over the correlations of real GDP growth rates from the bilateral
pairings. All countries category includes: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and United States. The English-speaking countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom and United States. 
 
A number of results emerge from Table 1. First, the mean correlation for all 
countries in our sample falls from 0.31 in the early period, 1960–1979, to 0.27 in 
the later period, 1980–2000. While not a large fall, it is somewhat surprising; 
arguably, economies are more closely integrated in the later period and we might 
have expected the mean correlation to rise. Second, the dispersion (measured here 
simply as the difference between the minimum and maximum correlation) is 
significantly greater in the sub-samples than it is for the full sample; and in both 
cases, this arises because of much lower correlations appearing in the sub-samples. 
This also explains why the mean correlation is higher for the full sample. It 
suggests that the sub-samples are influenced by periods of idiosyncratic behaviour, 
behaviour that gets washed out over the longer sample. While this is a potential 
advantage of the longer sample, weighing against this are concerns that there has 
been considerable structural change in the international economic environment, 
which undermines the use of the full sample. 
We can examine the stability of the bilateral correlations in two ways. First by 
plotting the correlations for the 1980–2000 sample against those for 1960–1979; 
this is reported in Figure 1. This figure indicates that there is a relatively weak 
(although statistically significant) positive relationship between the two sets of 
correlation measures. A second approach is to estimate the density function 
(essentially a smoothed histogram) for the estimated correlations over the full 5 
 
 
sample 1960–2000 and over the two sub-samples. All three densities are shown in 
Figure 2.5 The most important difference between the density functions is that 
those for the sub-samples include more (and larger) negative correlations than the 
density function for the full sample. It would appear that the large negative 
correlations observed in the two sub-samples are only a transitory feature. Thus 
pairs of countries that are negatively correlated in one period tend to be positively 
correlated in the other period.  
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Neither Figure 1 or 2 can be taken as direct evidence that the changes in the 
international economic environment have altered the nature of the relationships 
between economies. For example, the changing pattern of correlations could reflect 
changing patterns of trade (if trade relationships were principally responsible for 
the correlation of GDP growth). Nonetheless, the weak relationship between the 
two periods that is indicated by Figure 1 suggests that it may be difficult to 
adequately model the complete sample. For this reason, we choose to focus our 
analysis on the latter sub-sample 1980–2000. This also has the advantage of 
providing information that is likely to be relevant to the current international 
economic environment. 
Finally, to provide some further feel for the data, Figures 3 and 4 present the 
twenty most closely and least closely correlated pairs. Correlations for both the 
1960–1979 and 1980–2000 period are reported; the correlations are ordered on the 




































Note:  See Table B1 for an explanation of country codes. 
Not too surprisingly, numbered among the highly correlated economies are pairs of 
European countries, such as Spain (ES) and France (FR).6 These countries are all 
quite closely integrated, both through trade and, for many, through common 
monetary policy, as well as many other European initiatives for greater economic 
and political integration that have come into force since the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. Also, not too surprisingly, Canada (CA) and the United States (US) are the 
most highly correlated two economies in the 1980–2000 period (and the second 
highest in the earlier period). What is surprising is the fact that the correlation of 
Australia with the US (and by implication Canada) is among the highest of our 
group of countries. As we noted in the introduction, this high correlation is 
somewhat difficult to explain and is one of the motivations for the current study. It 
is interesting to note that this high correlation between Australia and the US is a 
feature only of the 1980–2000 period; for the earlier sample, the correlation is only 
0.16. 
                                           
6   An index of country codes is provided in Appendix B. 8 
 
 

























Note:  See Table B1 for an explanation of country codes. 
The least correlated economies are presented in Figure 4. The two countries that 
appear most often in this regard are Japan (JP) and New Zealand (NZ). This 
probably reflects the unique events that these countries experienced over a 
considerable part of the sample period. In the case of New Zealand, the large 
structural reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s; in the case of Japan, the 
stagnant growth that occurred in the wake of the bursting of the asset price bubble 
in the early 1990s. These two examples serve to highlight that idiosyncratic events 
can be influential and need to be borne in mind throughout the analysis. It also 
seems that country-specific shocks are not necessarily transmitted via trading links 
to other economies. While Japan is a major export destination for Australian 
goods, output growth in these two countries is virtually uncorrelated in the   
1980–2000 period. 
Table 1 also reports the correlations among the English-speaking economies of our 
sample: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), New Zealand (NZ), United Kingdom (GB) 
and United States (US). The strong correlation between GDP growth in Australia 
and the US has already been noted. In addition, other studies (for example   9 
 
 
Artis 2000) have noted a strong correlation between the US and UK business 
cycle, despite the close trade, financial and, at least until 1992, policy linkages of 
the UK with the European economies. From this, it seems useful to consider the 
English-speaking economies as a group. 
For the full sample and the most recent sample, the mean correlation among the 
English-speaking economies is significantly higher than the mean correlation for 
all countries. The most dramatic difference occurs in the 1980–2000 sample. For 
this period, all of the correlations are positive, 0.22–0.85, and the mean correlation 
is nearly twice that of the full set of countries, 0.52 compared to 0.27. 
Interestingly, this strong relationship between these economies is not apparent in 
the 1960–1979 sample. Although the correlations are uniformly positive, the mean 
correlation is the same as that for the entire set of countries, 0.31. 
The empirical models that we develop in this paper seek to explain the bilateral 
correlations for all of the countries in the sample. However, given our interest in 
Australia and the US, and the English-speaking countries more generally, we 
examine in some detail the ability of our model to explain the pattern of bilateral 
correlation that we observe for these countries.  
2. Framework   
Our objective is to try to explain why output growth rates of some pairs of 
countries are highly (positively) correlated and why others are not. This is a 
complicated task and economic theory does not provide a great deal of guidance, 
apart from suggesting particular directions to explore. Consequently, we proceed in 
a relatively ad hoc manner, using a series of simple regression models to better 
understand what underlies the cross-section variation in the bilateral output growth 
correlations among the OECD countries in our sample. 
We do, however, attempt to put some structure on our approach. As noted in the 
introduction, there are two potential explanations for the correlation of output 
growth that we observe. The first explanation is that country or region specific 
shocks are transmitted through various economic interdependencies between 
countries. That is, it is economic transmission channels that are important for the 
synchronisation of business cycles among the industrialised economies and that the 10 
 
 
stronger the transmission channels between two countries the larger the expected 
(positive) correlation between their growth rates. The second explanation is that 
there are common shocks affecting the industrialised economies. In this case, we 
expect that countries with similar economic structure are likely to be highly 
correlated. Our approach is to build upwards to an empirical model that captures 
the contributions of both these types of explanations. 
We consider three broad types of transmission channels in the analysis that 
follows; trade in goods and services, trade in financial assets, and the coordination 
or similarity of monetary policies. This list is not exhaustive, for example it does 
not consider the transmission of confidence or sentiment nor does it consider the 
coordination of fiscal policies; however, it does capture what are likely to be the 
three most important channels. 
To examine the role of common shocks, we consider a number of economic, 
institutional and geographic characteristics. In particular, we examine the similarity 
between countries of industry structure, corporate governance, structural economic 
policies, adoption of new technologies, as well as whether countries share a 
common language or are geographically adjacent. Some care, however, must be 
taken when interpreting these results. In some instances, it will be natural to 
interpret these as suggesting a similar response to common shocks; for example, 
the similarity or otherwise of industry structure. In other instances, however, 
similarity in certain characteristics may suggest a greater likelihood of integration 
of the two economies; for example, a shared language. We return to this issue 
when we discuss the empirical results. 
2.1 Regression  Model 
Our empirical model is a cross section regression model using the bilateral 
correlation pairs as the dependent variable. The sample period over which the 
correlations are measured is denoted τ . There are N  countries in the sample. For 
country i, the four-quarter-ended growth rate of GDP over the sample period τ  is 
denoted  , ˆi y τ . The correlations are denoted, 
  ,, , ˆˆ (, ) ij i j corr y y ττ τ ρ =  11 
 
 
for all  ,, ij Ni j ∈≠ .7 Our objective is to explain these bilateral correlations, either 
as a function of economic interaction between any two countries or, in the case of 
common shocks affecting all economies, as a function of common economic 
structure. 
It is useful to begin by focusing initially on bilateral trade intensity, i.e. some 
measure of the importance of bilateral trade in goods and services between two 
countries. Denote the trade intensity between two countries i and j as  ij T .8 Then the 
regression model is: 
  ,0 1 , , ij ij ij T ττ τ ρβ β ε =+ +  (1) 
The error term  , ij τ ε  is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with 
mean zero.  
There is, however, a difficulty with estimating the above model using ordinary 
least squares, as noted in Frankel and Rose (1998), which uses this model to 
consider empirical issues of optimum currency areas. These authors note that two 
countries that have a large amount of bilateral trade are more likely to link their 
currencies together (either explicitly or implicitly). This implies that the same two 
countries will operate monetary policy (and possibly other policies) in a similar 
fashion and this may, as a consequence, synchronise the business cycles of these 
two countries. In this case, it is not only the trade of goods and services that cause 
the business cycles to be correlated but rather the operation of economic policies. 
What this means for the regression above is that using ordinary least squares will 
give the wrong answer; it cannot identify the separate contribution from trade and 
the contribution from the common policies enacted because of the close trading 
relationship. 
The difficulty that Frankel and Rose highlight is part of a more general problem; 
economic characteristics and/or interdependence between two economies are likely 
to explain bilateral trade as well as bilateral GDP correlations. One approach to 
resolve this problem is to specify a simultaneous equation structural model that 
                                           
7   There are N(N-1)/2 such correlations. 




explains both the correlations of GDP growth and bilateral trade interdependencies 
as well as the other interdependencies of interest. This is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, we use instrumental variables. 
To provide some intuition, we can go a little ways to constructing a structural 
model. In particular, we could make use of the gravity model (Rose 2000) for 
bilateral trade: 
  ,0 1 , , ij ij ij TZ ττ τ δδ υ =+ +  (2) 
Here  , ij Z τ  is a set of exogenous variables such as the geographic distance between 
the two economies and whether or not the two economies are adjacent. Variables 
such as these have been shown to explain bilateral trade very well and can be 
reasonably treated as exogenous. Estimation of Equation (1) by instrumental 
variables can be viewed as first estimating Equation (2) and then using the 
predicted values from this regression in place of those in Equation (1) (that is, two 
stage least squares). What we are doing is first predicting how much trade two 
countries should have based upon their exogenous characteristics. We then use this 
predicted trade intensity to explain the bilateral correlation. The fact that we are 
using predicted trade rather than actual trade means that we will not fit the data as 
well; but it also means that we can get an estimate of  1 β  that only depends upon 
trade (more correctly, things that explain trade), and not policy or other forms of 
interdependence. Of course, this assumes that the variables we are using to predict 
trade do not also help explain, directly or indirectly, the bilateral correlations.9 
Ideally, we would like to augment Equation (1) with other channels for the 
transmission of shocks. We would also like to control for the possibility that what 
underlies the co-movement of two economies is not the transmission of shocks 
from one country to another but rather a common shock to both economies from an 
external source. In this case, it is necessary to consider what characteristics two 
countries have in common that ensure they move together in response to the 
common shock (e.g. an oil price shock). A more general regression model is then: 
  ,0 1 ,2 ,3 ,3 , , ij ij ij ij ij ij TFPD ττ τ τ τ τ ρβ β β β β ε =+ + + + +  (3) 
                                           
9  The above is an attempt to describe the instrumental variable methods we employ using a  
two stage least squares interpretation of the estimation. 13 
 
 
For any two countries i and j,  , ij F τ  measures the degree of financial integration; 
, ij P τ  the degree of policy interdependence, and  , ij D τ  a measure of the similarity (or 
dissimilarity) of the economic structure of the two economies. More generally, 
, ij D τ  can be a set of variables describing common characteristics that either explain 
a common response to common shocks or explain business cycle correlations 
directly. 
It is worth highlighting now the difficulties associated with estimating   
Equation (3). Broadly speaking, the data we have is not rich enough to adequately 
identify the contributions of each of these different channels or characteristics. Put 
differently, if we estimate an equation such as (3) it is very difficult to get sensible 
results. If we viewed the problem in a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression context, there is a great deal of co-linearity between the variables of our 
general model. As a consequence, we proceed from the simple to the more 
complex in an attempt to tease as much information from the data as we can. 
3. Empirical  Results 
3.1 Transmission  Channels 
We begin by examining individually the three different classes of transmission 
mechanisms identified previously: trade in goods and services; trade in assets; and 
policy influences. We estimate a simple linear regression model for each channel, 
in each case considering a number of different possible measures. The results from 
using OLS are reported in Table 2 and, based upon the discussion above, those 
from using instrumental variables (IV) in Table 3.  
3.1.1  Trade in goods and services 
The principal traditional channel for spillover effects is trade, with the sharpest 
spillovers [from the United States] to those countries with the highest ratios of 
exports to the United States relative to their incomes. (Meyer 2001) 
Trade in goods and services is the most commonly identified mechanism by which 
fluctuations in the level of activity in one economy spill over into other economies. 
An expansion in aggregate demand in one country may be transmitted through an 14 
 
 
increase in demand for traded goods and services to other countries. The extent to 
which this happens and contributes to the correlation of output growth between 
two economies depends upon two factors: the extent of bilateral trade and its 
importance in aggregate demand. One can also motivate a supply-side explanation 
through intermediate imported inputs. If growth in one economy is associated with 
an expansion in production of intermediate inputs used by a second economy then, 
through falling prices or simply greater access to supply, production in the second 
economy may also rise, causing output growth to be correlated.10 Both of these 
explanations point toward a positive relationship between bilateral trade and output 
growth correlations. 
The possibility exists, however, that increased trade between two countries may 
lead to greater specialisation to capture gains from comparative advantage. If 
industry specific shocks are important, then we might expect less correlation 
between two countries as each is affected by idiosyncratic shocks.11 This suggests 
that in theory at least the role of bilateral trade in explaining cross-country growth 
correlations is ambiguous.  
To examine the role empirically we require a measure of aggregate bilateral trade 
intensity between pairs of countries. There are a number of indices that one might 
use, all of which are somewhat arbitrary. We use the natural logarithm of the 
following index,  
 
11 max ,






−−  ++ 

 
  (4) 
where  ijt X  is total nominal merchandise exports from country i to country j in 
period t,  ijt M is total nominal merchandise imports of country i from country j in 
period t, and  it Y  is nominal GDP for country i in period t. In principle, the two 
numerators in the above index should be equal, however differences can arise since 
                                           
10  This argument is investigated more thoroughly in Canova and Dellas (1993). 
11   Frankel and Rose (1998) discuss this issue further; notice that the argument presumes that 
trade is primarily characterised by inter-industry rather than intra-industry trade. Two further 
points are also in order with respect to this prediction. First, if industry specific shocks are 
important, we might expect less specialization to avoid the effects of these shocks. Second, 
relative price effects can offset this to some extent, a point made by Cole and Obstfeld (1991). 15 
 
 
ijt X  and  jit M  are measured by different statistical agencies. See the data appendix 
for further discussion. 
Our index captures two aspects of bilateral trade. First, the numerator measures the 
amount or intensity of trade between two countries by summing bilateral imports 
and exports. Second, by scaling with nominal GDP we can measure the relative 
importance of the bilateral trade to total production in each economy. We use the 
maximum of the average over the sample of the two possible measures because 
what is likely to matter for the interdependence of two economies is whether or not 
at least one is exposed to the other. As a specific example, consider Australia and 
Japan. Trade with Japan is large for Australia and will be, relative to other 
Australian trading partners, a large share of Australian GDP. From a trade 
perspective, this suggests that Australia is well integrated with Japan. From Japan’s 
perspective, the share of bilateral trade with Australia relative to Japanese GDP is 
small, principally because Japan’s GDP is large and Japan has other more 
important trading partners. So, arguably, the interdependence with Japan is largely 
one way and we would expect shocks to flow one way – from Japan toward 
Australia. But this may be sufficient for the two countries to have a correlated 
growth rate. Using the maximum of the two trade intensities captures this 
possibility of one-way interdependence without sacrificing information about 
possible two-way interdependence.12 
In addition to using Equation (4) as an index of total bilateral trade, we also 
calculate analogous measures for imports and exports individually. This allows us 
to examine whether exports or imports appear to be a more important transmission 
channel. 
The results for the three measures of trade intensity are reported in columns (1)–(3) 
in Table 2 (OLS) and Table 3 (Instrumental Variables). Setting aside any concerns 
about endogeneity for the moment, consider first the OLS estimates in Table 2. For 
all three measures of trade intensity we find a statistically significant positive 
effect on bilateral output correlations. The fit of these regressions is also similar; 
the R-bar squared ranging from 8 to 10 per cent. So that we can compare these 
                                           
12   Alternative measures that have been used are total bilateral trade as a share of total trade and 
total bilateral trade as a share of aggregate GDP; see Frankel and Rose (1998). The first 
suffers from not measuring the relative importance of trade in the overall economy. The 
second suffers from obscuring one-way interdependence. 16 
 
 
results to the IV results, we also report the simple correlation between the 
predicted and actual correlations; consistent with the low R-bar squared values, 
these are just below 0.30. 
A word of caution about interpreting the regression coefficients is necessary at this 
point. The dependent variable in the regression model is a non-linear 
transformation of the bilateral correlations we are modelling. It is necessary to use 
this transformation to ensure that the predicted values of the model lie between  
–1 and 1 consistent with correlation measures; we discuss the transformation we 
use in greater detail in Appendix A. As a result of the transformation, it is not 
straightforward to put a meaningful interpretation on the size of the coefficient 
estimates reported in the tables and for the time being we focus purely on their sign 
and significance. At a later stage, when we have a richer representation of the data, 





Table 2: Channels for Transmission of Shocks – OLS Estimates 
Dependent variable: bilateral GDP growth correlations 1980–2000 
  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  (7)  (8) 
Constant  1.2028 1.2903 1.2597 1.1637 1.0020 1.6832 0.8559 –0.3048 
  (6.1601) (5.9633) (5.5139) (9.0635) (7.6992) (3.1647) (5.9340) (–1.1610) 
Trade in goods           
Trade intensity: total  0.1490               
  (3.4136)          
Trade  intensity:  exports    0.1433         
    (3.4872)         
Trade intensity: imports      0.1402           
     (3.1030)           
Trade in assets           
FDI intensity        0.1126         
       (4.8911)         
Interest rate spreads: long          –0.5670       
         (–3.5630)       
Share  return  spreads        –0.3459     
        (–2.0765)     
Monetary policy           
Interest rate spreads: short              –0.3250  
         (–1.9615)  
Exchange rate deviations                –0.2686 
          (–3.3285) 
R-bar  squared  0.093 0.100 0.078 0.152 0.086 0.028 0.017  0.066 
Correlation  0.284 0.297 0.261 0.389 0.296 0.166 0.150  0.250 
Sigma  0.554 0.552 0.559 0.536 0.556 0.573 0.576  0.562 
Notes:  The countries used are the 17 OECD countries identified in the text, providing 136 country pairs (the number of observations for the regression
models). The dependent variable is a transformation of the bilateral GDP growth correlations calculated over 1980–2000. See Appendix A for 
details of the transformation. Numbers in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors calculated using the
HC (3) adjustment as described in Davidson and MacKinnon (DM) (1993, p 554). Correlation refers to the simple correlation between the actual






Table 3: Channels for Transmission of Shocks – IV Estimates 
Dependent variable: bilateral GDP growth correlations 1980–2000 
  (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)    (5)   (6)  (7)  (8) 
Constant  1.6179 1.7540 1.7965 1.4532 1.2457  3.9005  1.4322  –0.5736 
 (6.9771)  (6.8900)  (6.3477)  (7.2469)  (6.3887) (4.3836)  (7.2820)  (–1.7511) 
Trade in goods            
Trade intensity: total  0.2503               
 (4.5218)               
Trade intensity: exports    0.2386             
   (4.6567)             
Trade intensity: imports      0.2530           
     (4.3097)         
Trade in assets            
FDI intensity        0.1696         
       (4.4574)         
Interest rate spreads: long          –0.9048       
         (–3.5296)      
Share  return  spreads        –1.0492    
        (–3.7002)    
Monetary policy            
Interest rate spreads: short              –1.0369   
          (–4.3779)   
Exchange rate deviations                –0.3491 
            (–3.4973) 
OI  restrictions  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Instrument  quality  0.610 0.606 0.569 0.487 0.288  0.328  0.335 0.621 
DWH  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.132  0.001  0.002 0.126 
Correlation  0.280 0.294 0.258 0.388 0.296  0.156  0.143 0.250 
Sigma  0.564 0.562 0.571 0.544 0.562  0.612  0.606 0.560 
Notes:  As for Table 2. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for IV calculated using 
HC (3); see DM (1993, p 609). OI refers to the marginal significance levels for the test of the over-identification restrictions; see DM (1993, p 235). 
DWH refers to the marginal significance level from a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for consistency of the OLS estimate; see DM (1993, p 239). The 
instrument quality measure is the R-bar squared from the first stage regression. 19 
 
 
There are a number of points that emerge from these results. First, although trade is 
a statistically significant explanation of the bilateral output growth correlations, it 
does not explain very much. Second, the positive relationship between trade and 
output growth correlations suggests that it is the transmission of shocks through 
trade that explains the correlation. That is, there is no evidence to support the 
conjecture that greater trade through specialisation leads to less synchronised 
economies. This positive relationship is consistent with other studies, Canova and 
Dellas (1993); Frankel and Rose (1998) and Clark and van Wincoop (1999). 
Finally, there is some (very) weak evidence that export linkages matter slightly 
more; the export measure provides a marginally better fit but the difference is 
small.13 
The instrumental variables results are reported in Table 3 and provide the same 
conclusions.14 Interestingly, the coefficients on trade are much larger than the OLS 
estimates reported in Table 2; exactly why this is so is not clear. As we develop the 
model further, however, this issue goes away and so need not concern us   
here.15 The difference in the OLS and IV estimates is reflected in the   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993), the marginal 
significance levels for which are reported in the table. These indicate that we can 
reject the hypothesis that the IV and the OLS estimates are the same, providing 
support for using IV methods. Also reported in Table 3 for each regression   
                                           
13    A natural direction to consider would be to include both the export and import intensity 
together. Because the two series are highly correlated such a model is not well behaved; 
however, the results clearly suggest the dominance of the export intensity measure. 
14   The instruments used are the following: the natural logarithm of the distance between two 
countries; a dummy variable for whether the two countries are adjacent; a dummy variable for 
whether the two countries share a common language; a dummy variable for whether two 
countries share a particular common legal origin (English, French, German or Scandinavian); 
a bilateral index of accounting standards; and a bilateral index of the concentration of firm 
ownership. The geographic and language variables are from Frankel and Rose (1998) and are 
typical variables used in gravity models for bilateral trade, hence their use as instruments 
here. The common legal origin variables, the accounting standard variable, and the   
firm ownership variable are measures related to corporate governance and are taken from  
La Porta et al (1998). These instruments are included in part because they may explain 
bilateral trade but also because they may explain (or at least be correlated with) bilateral trade 
in assets or common policy behaviour. We initially use a fixed set of instruments for all IV 
regressions, which explains why they are included here. 
15   In their study of trade and growth, Frankel and Romer (1999) obtain a similar result for, we 




are measures of instrument quality; for these single variable models, we report the 
R-bar squared from the first stage regression. A larger number indicates that the 
instruments we have are good in the sense that they explain the endogenous 
regressors well. 
Finally, Table 3 reports tests for the over-identifying restrictions, as described in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). For all three models, and indeed all of the 
models in Table 3, we reject these restrictions. The most likely explanation is that 
the channel we are modelling, in this case trade, is not the only means by which 
our instruments influence the bilateral correlations. It may be the case that our 
instruments explain other channels, for example trade in assets or common 
monetary policies, and our model is incorrectly restricting their role to operate only 
through trade. It may also be the case that our instruments explain output 
correlations directly themselves. We return to these issues below when we develop 
a more complete empirical model. 
3.1.2 Financial  linkages 
…additional linkages most likely arise directly and indirectly, at least in part, from 
the increasingly tight connection among financial markets and the resulting 
synchronization of the global equity correction. (Meyer 2001)  
Financial market linkages are a widely acknowledged mechanism for the 
international transmission of business cycle shocks. To examine this transmission 
channel, we consider three different classes of investment; foreign direct 
investment (FDI), trade in equities, and trade in long-term bonds. For FDI, we can 
obtain information on stocks and flows on a bilateral basis so that we can construct 
bilateral indices in much the same way as we do with trade flows. For equity and 
debt instruments, it is difficult to construct meaningful measures of bilateral flows 
so we measure integration in this context using bilateral spreads in asset returns. 
The transmission of shocks through debt and equity markets is relatively 
straightforward to motivate. Suppose that capital is relatively mobile between two 
economies, then a change in saving and investment decisions in one is likely to 
affect the price and availability of financial assets in the other, which should, all 
else equal, lead to more closely synchronised business cycles. FDI is less 21 
 
 
straightforward to motivate as a transmission channel so we need to consider this 
in slightly more detail. 
We can think of a number of ways in which the extent of foreign direct investment 
can be related to the degree of business cycle correlation. At a simple level we can 
think in terms of aggregate demand and supply effects in much the same way as we 
view trade intensities. That is, countries that are closely integrated through FDI 
may transmit shocks to each other through the changes in FDI positions brought 
about by idiosyncratic shocks. In this case, it is FDI flows that matter. Our view, 
however, is that this is not a particularly important channel, largely because the 
size of these flows (on average) relative to GDP are likely to be small nor do we 
anticipate that these flows will be very cyclical, certainly not to the same extent as 
trade flows. 
It seems more useful instead to think in terms of FDI stocks and how strong 
bilateral FDI positions might contribute to the synchronisation of business cycles. 
There are a number of possibilities. First, multinational firms may distribute the 
effects of local macroeconomic shocks throughout the organisation thus 
distributing the shock, to some extent, from one economy to another. An example 
of this might be the retrenchment of staff worldwide in a multinational 
organisation suffering a downturn in some of its markets. Similarly, if FDI is 
generated by multinationals sourcing production of intermediate inputs abroad, 
then the effects of changes in demand for final products may be transmitted to 
countries providing the intermediate inputs. From a similar perspective, income 
flows generated by FDI positions may also serve to synchronise the business 
cycles of countries with strong FDI linkages (Meyer 2001). Finally, FDI may also 
serve as a means by which technology and ideas are transferred between countries, 
which may also contribute to the correlation of output growth.16 
                                           
16  A further possibility is countries have a high degree of FDI between them as a consequence of 
firms attempting to reduce the risk they face by expanding and diversifying into markets with 
different cyclical patterns. In this case, we might suspect that FDI is inversely related to 
business cycle correlations. This is analogous to the argument that trade intensities will be 
inversely related to business cycle correlations as different countries specialise in different 
industries to capture gains from comparative advantage. The results in Tables 2 and 3 do not 
support these arguments, however. 22 
 
 
To measure bilateral direct foreign investment intensity, we use an index identical 
in structure to that used for bilateral trade, with inward and outward foreign direct 
investment positions in place of exports and imports. To measure financial 
integration of equity and debt markets on a bilateral basis, we construct spreads on 
real returns for both markets. We then calculate the standard deviation of these 
spreads over the sample period. The greater the extent of financial integration 
between two countries, the lower this measure should be; that is, there should be a 
negative relationship between this measure and the correlation of output growth.17 
We consider each measure individually; these results are reported in   
columns (4)–(6) in Table 2 and 3. As before, the OLS and IV results provide the 
same information. Now, however, it is very difficult to justify the use of OLS, 
particularly with respect to the spreads on the real bond and equity returns, as the 
direction of causation is clearly ambiguous. Countries with highly correlated 
business cycles, say due to common shocks, are likely to have similar patterns of 
interest rates and equity returns even if there is no financial linkages between the 
two economies. Our IV estimates attempt to control for this. They use exogenous 
information to predict the extent of variation in real returns between two countries; 
we then consider the relationship between the predicted variation in real returns 
and the correlation in output growth. In principle, this provides a consistent 
estimate of the true effect of the relationship between financial integration and 
output growth correlations.18 
For both the OLS and IV results, the coefficients on the three measures of financial 
integration, FDI intensity, Interest rate spreads: long, and Share return spreads, are 
statistically significant and of the predicted sign. In terms of overall fit, either the 
R-bar squared measure for the OLS results or the simple correlation between the 
predicted and actual output correlations, the best model is that for intensity of FDI. 
The weakest fit comes from the spread on real equity returns, in large part 
reflecting the high degree of variation across country pairs for this variable. 
Despite the weakness of the fit, the finding that equity market linkages are 
                                           
17   We take the natural logarithm of all three measures. Full details on the construction of these 
series are presented in Appendix B. We have also considered mean absolute values of these 
spreads as a measure of financial integration. This provides very similar results; 
econometrically, the standard deviation measure is somewhat better behaved. 
18  This depends of course upon the quality and validity of the instruments; the instrument set are 
those described in the previous section. 23 
 
 
significant is consistent with a number of studies that have emphasised this 
channel; Meyer (2001) points to this as a possibly important aspect of the current 
global situation. For Australia, both de Roos and Russell (1996) and Dungey and 
Pagan (2000) find evidence in time series data that US asset price shocks have an 
important impact on Australian activity. Our results suggest that this finding for the 
US and Australia is consistent with the results for a much larger group of OECD 
countries.  
3.1.3 Monetary  policy 
The similarity or otherwise of monetary policies of two countries is often put 
forward as a principal explanation for common business cycles. For example, 
differences in monetary policies are a likely explanation for the lower than 
expected correlation between the UK and other European countries in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (Kohler 2001). Similarly, the high 
correlation of output among members of the ERM is likely to be due in part to  
the consequent common monetary policy (see the discussion in Frankel and   
Rose (1998)). 
Observed common behaviour of monetary policies between two (or more) 
countries is likely to reflect one of three factors: similar responses to common 
shocks; similar responses to shocks that are transmitted from another country or 
the coordination (explicitly or implicitly) of monetary policy. Under a flexible 
bilateral exchange rate regime, common monetary policies (for example, highly 
correlated short-term interest rates) can arise from common underlying shocks. The 
correlation of interest rates will strengthen the more similar the two economies are 
in structure, including the mandate and strategies of the central banks involved 
(Meyer 2001). In this case, common monetary policies and business cycle 
behaviour are an indication of common economic structure and underlying shocks. 
This is not the only explanation, however, for commonality of both business cycles 
and monetary policy. If two countries are closely integrated through trade and 
financial markets, then an idiosyncratic shock to one can be transferred to the other 
through these linkages; if the two countries share similar monetary policy 
objectives, then we again observe common business cycle and monetary policy 
behaviour, although this time the underlying explanation is the presence of other 
transmission channels. An important implicit assumption in this argument is that 24 
 
 
the flexible exchange rate does not insulate the small country from all types of 
external shocks.19 
With fixed bilateral exchange rates, the monetary policies of two countries are 
explicitly and automatically coordinated. In this case, monetary policy serves as a 
transmission channel for idiosyncratic shocks and also ensures a common response 
to common shocks; in both instances, the coordinated monetary policy is likely to 
contribute to stronger correlation of growth cycles. 
Based upon all of these arguments, we expect a positive relationship between the 
closeness of monetary policy stance and similarity of business cycles for any two 
countries. Clearly, however, what underlies the relationship and the direction of 
causation is very difficult to discern. Empirically, we need to control for the 
endogeneity of the behaviour of monetary policy as well as for other aspects that 
might explain the common growth cycles (e.g. trade and financial integration).  
For the moment, our principle concern is examining the simple relationship 
between monetary policy stance and business cycle correlations, so we abstract 
from other influences (as we have done in the previous sections). We consider two 
measures of the degree of coordination between two economies. The first is a 
measure of the volatility of the bilateral real short-term interest rate differentials; 
the lower this volatility, the more similar is monetary policy in two countries.20 
The second is the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate, which is more 
directly related to whether or not two countries explicitly or implicitly maintain a 
fixed exchange rate.21  
                                           
19   There is some evidence that flexible exchange rates do not provide this insulation role, see 
Artis and Ehrmann (2000). 
20   Clark and van Wincoop (1999) consider a similar measure in their examination of bilateral 
output correlations for 14 EU economies. They find that once trade intensity and country size 
are controlled for, interest rate differentials are not a significant explanation of output 
correlations. 
21  Buiter (2000) argues that movements in exchange rates are themselves an important source of 
shocks. If so, on a bilateral basis this would have asymmetric effects for two economies and 
consequently lower bilateral output correlations. Frankel and Rose (1998) also consider the 
role of a fixed versus flexible exchange rate regime as a potential explanation for bilateral 
output correlations. They use both a dummy variable approach and one based on actual 
bilateral exchange rate volatility but find no significant effects after controlling for the effect 
of trade. 25 
 
 
Columns (7)–(8) of Tables 2 and 3 contain the results for our measures of the 
degree of monetary policy coordination. As before, the OLS and IV results provide 
the same information: both measures are statistically significant and of the correct 
sign. Greater volatility of either the short-term interest rate differentials or the 
bilateral exchange rates are associated with lower output growth correlations. 
Based upon the R-bar squared for the OLS estimates and the correlation of actual 
and predicted values for both the IV and OLS estimates, the exchange rate 
volatility measure provides a better fit of the data.  
The estimates in column (8) have a rather interesting prediction. Suppose that two 
countries can fix their nominal exchange rate, then over time they should expect to 
see an increase in the correlation of their growth rates. To be specific, consider the 
case of West Germany and Austria, the pair of countries with the minimum amount 
of bilateral exchange rate volatility in our sample.22 Based on model (8) in Table 3, 
the exchange rate volatility for these two countries predicts a bilateral correlation 
of 0.69 (the observed bilateral growth correlation for this country pair is 0.61). We 
have to be somewhat careful, however, in attributing this to transmission of shocks 
through the common monetary policy arising from fixed exchange rates; it may 
reflect (at least in part) the indirect effect of lower exchange rate volatility on 
bilateral trade flows.23 In order to control for this, we need to consider more 
general models. 
The results overall in Tables 2 and 3 are interesting for a number of reasons. First, 
we are able to confirm the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) of the role of trade 
in goods in explaining the bilateral output growth correlations. It is also clear, 
however, that trade is by no means the full explanation. The OLS results indicate 
that bilateral trade intensity can explain about 10 per cent of the cross-country 
variation in bilateral growth correlations. What is also apparent is that we can find 
a number of other variables in addition to trade in goods that seem to provide 
channels for the transmission of shocks between countries. In fact none of the 
                                           
22   The standard deviation of the quarterly log difference of the exchange rate for these two 
countries is 0.1 per cent. We use a specific example rather than set the exchange rate volatility 
to zero since the model is estimated using the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of 
the bilateral exchange rate, which is undefined when there is no exchange rate volatility. 
23    Against this, however, is a substantial empirical literature that finds little evidence that 
exchange rate volatility reduces the level of international trade; see Gagnon (1993). 26 
 
 
variables that we consider clearly dominates in its ability to explain bilateral 
growth correlations. 
How good are these models? Not surprisingly our results also indicate that none of 
the single variable models does a particularly good job at explaining bilateral 
correlations. For the OLS results, we obtain R-bar squared statistics ranging from 
0.02 to 0.15. A more serious concern arises with the instrumental variables results, 
though. For all of the models, the over-identifying restrictions are strongly 
rejected, indicating some form of model misspecification. The most reasonable 
interpretation of these results is that important explanatory factors are omitted from 
these regressions, an issue we now consider. 
3.2  Industry Structure and Transmission Channels 
We now extend the models of the previous section to control for the effects of 
common shocks. To do this, we follow Imbs (2000) and use a measure of the 
difference or distance between the industry structures of two economies. Imbs 
argues that if sector-specific economic shocks are a major source of economic 
fluctuations then countries with similar economic structures should display 
relatively high bilateral output growth correlations. To measure the distance 
between the industry structures of two countries, we construct the following index 
based upon Krugman (1991): 
  ,, ,
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=−   (5)   
where  , ik t l  denotes employment in sector k as a share of total employment in 
country i and M is the total number of sectors. (See Appendix B for further details.) 
For our analysis, we use the employment shares for 1989, roughly the middle of 
the sample. 
Table 4 presents estimates of models containing the industry structure index   
and our various transmission channels. Initially, we considered two measures of  
cross-country differences in industry structure: one (similar to Imbs) using   
three-digit employment data for manufacturing and a second broader measure 
using one-digit employment data for the entire economy. Given the manufacturing 
industry’s declining relative importance in OECD economies and the broader 27 
 
 
nature of the one-digit index, the latter measure would seem in some ways to be a 
preferable indicator of cross-country differences in industry structure. It turns out 
that this is indeed the case; the manufacturing-based index performs substantially 
worse than the broader industry measure. Consequently, we only reports results for 
the broader index.24 
For all of the models in Table 4, which consider the different transmission 
channels discussed previously as well as the industry structure index, we find a 
statistically significant role for differences in industry structure as an explanation 
of bilateral growth correlations. The greater the difference in industry structures of 
a pair of countries, the lower is their correlation in their output growth. 
When considered by itself, it explains about 5 per cent of the cross-country 
variation.25 When included with the other transmission channels it remains 
statistically significant and the correct sign. Interestingly, it does not significantly 
alter the contributions of each channel; the coefficient estimates for these variables 
are slightly smaller (in absolute value) than in Table 3 but the same order of 
magnitude.  
One attractive aspect of the models in Table 4 is that they contain variables that 
can capture both the transmission of country-specific shocks between countries and 
also the impact of common shocks within countries. This goes some way to 
addressing concerns that the transmission channels such as the short-term interest 
rate and exchange rate deviations are capturing the effects of common shocks, 
explaining both common monetary policy and common business cycles. It is clear, 
however, from the test of the over-identifying restrictions for the various models 
that all of the important factors in explaining bilateral growth correlations have not 
yet been included.  
                                           
24    In his study, which uses 21 OECD countries for the period 1959–1993, Imbs finds that   
his manufacturing-based index has a strong significant negative relationship with bilateral 
growth correlations. Moreover, this variable dominates the contribution of bilateral trade 
intensities – which is a very strong result. For our sample of data, however, we have not been 
able to replicate Imbs’ findings. 
25   We use OLS for this model as we do not believe that industry structure is an endogenous 





Table 4: Industry Structure and Transmission Channels 
Dependent variable: bilateral GDP growth correlations 1980–2000 
   (1)  (2)    (3)   (4)   (5)  (6)  (7)   
Constant  1.0551  1.7915      1.6260  1.6469  3.8761  1.7780  –0.0741   
  (5.7027)  (7.1425)     (7.1621)  (6.2788)  (4.6442)  (6.5806)  (–0.1897)   
Industry structure              
Total industry  –1.9889  –1.1397     –1.1088  –1.8987  –1.5034  –1.7900  –1.7134   
  (–2.6183)  (–1.5324)    (–1.5463)  (–2.4935)  (–2.0741)  (–2.1567)  (–2.2317)   
Trade in goods               
Trade intensity: total    0.2280             
   (4.0765)             
Trade in assets                
FDI Intensity          0.1529           
         (4.1322)           
Interest rate spreads: long        –0.8490         
       (–3.4638)         
Share return spreads          –0.9306       
         (–3.5081)       
Monetary policy                
Interest rate spreads: short            –0.9499     
           (–4.2693)     
Exchange rate deviations              –0.3188   
             (–3.2285)   
OI restrictions  –  0.000      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
Instrument quality  –  0.607      0.484  0.284  0.324  0.331  0.618   
DWH  –  0.002      0.045  0.167  0.002  0.003  0.203   
R-bar squared  0.052  –  –  –  –  –  –   
Correlation  0.241  0.317      0.415  0.369  0.220  0.232  0.330   
Sigma  0.566  0.552      0.532  0.542  0.588  0.585  0.545   
Notes:  As for Table 3. Estimates are by instrumental variables except for column (1) which is by ordinary least squares.  
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3.3  A Dominant Transmission Channel?  
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that there are a number of channels, other 
than trade in goods, by which shocks can be transmitted between countries. In 
Table 5 we examine the effect of augmenting a baseline model – containing   
the industry structure variable and bilateral (goods) trade intensity – with the other 
possible channels identified in Tables 2 and 3. To minimize problems of   
co-linearity, we begin by augmenting the baseline equation with each alternative 
transmission channel sequentially. 
It is apparent from columns (1) to (5) that trade in goods tends to dominate the 
other potential transmission channels in terms of statistical significance. The main 
exception is the model including goods trade and FDI reported in column (1), in 
which FDI has a larger t-statistic than trade intensity, although neither variable is 
individually significant by conventional criteria. The low individual t-statistics are 
likely a reflection of the high correlation (0.75) between our measure of FDI and 
total trade intensity. Rather than try and include both variables in the subsequent 
models we focus on trade intensity rather than FDI. On balance we feel that trade 
intensity is better understood as a transmission mechanism than FDI and in 
addition the degree of measurement error is likely to be greater in the FDI data 
than in the trade data. However as a check on the validity of this choice, we ensure 
that our final results are not significantly affected by the use of trade intensity 
rather than FDI intensity.  
Of the remaining transmission channels only the volatility of equity return spreads 
maintains its significance in the presence of trade intensity. Column (3), which 
includes industry structure, trade intensity and the spread on real equity returns 
provides two significant transmission channels, trade in goods and trade in 
financial assets, as well as controlling for common shocks. It seems natural to 
consider augmenting this model with the remaining transmission channel, 
monetary policy. This is done in column (6) using short-term interest rate spreads 
and column (7) using exchange rate volatilities. Comparing the two models, 
exchange rates appear to be more important than short-term interest rates in the 
transmission of shocks between countries. The lack of statistical significance of the 





Table 5: Trade, Industry Structure and Other Transmission Channels 
Dependent variable: bilateral GDP growth correlations 1980–2000 
   (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)   (7) 
Constant  1.7398 1.7522 3.1018 1.8493 1.6796  2.8733 2.4648 
  (6.8711) (7.0644) (4.2377) (8.1527) (2.4648)  (3.8689) (3.0859) 
Industry structure          
Total  industry  –1.0706 –1.0582 –1.0679 –1.1832 –1.1482  –1.1414 –1.1053 
  (–1.4820) (–1.3937) (–1.4474) (–1.5639) (–1.5333)  (–1.5222) (–1.4872) 
Trade in goods          
Trade intensity: total  0.1094  0.2551  0.1795  0.2071  0.2201  0.1645  0.1091 
  (1.0548) (3.0417) (2.9520) (2.6751) (2.9112)  (2.6632) (1.6163) 
Trade in assets          
FDI  intensity  0.0887         
  (1.3387)         
Interest rate spreads: long    0.1817           
   (0.5173)           
Share return spreads      –0.4839      –0.3815  –0.5829 
     (–1.9049)      (–1.5311)  (–2.4827) 
Monetary policy          
Interest rate spreads: short        –0.1648    –0.1716   
       (–0.6502)    (–0.7611)   
Exchange rate deviations          –0.0243    –0.2003 
         (–0.1864)    (–1.5921) 
OI  restrictions  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
















DWH  0.006 0.084 0.338 0.934 0.183  0.397 0.231 
Correlation  0.392 0.271 0.317 0.327 0.322  0.329 0.345 
Sigma  0.534 0.573 0.556 0.548 0.550  0.549 0.546 
Notes:  As for Table 4. An instrument quality measure due to Shea (1997) is reported for each endogenous variable. Model (6) uses a different set of
instruments than those used in models (1)–(5); see text for details. 31 
 
the hypothesis that coordination of monetary policy is an important transmission 
mechanism for shocks. The results in column (7) point to a model that has three 
transmission channels as well as the industry structure index controlling for 
common shocks. This suggests that share markets and exchange rate arrangements, 
along with trade intensities, are important transmission channels in their own right.  
Although the model in column (7) appears to capture quite well the three 
transmission channels we initially posited as important as well as controlling for 
common shocks to some extent, as a statistical model it cannot be viewed as 
complete. The test for the over-identification restrictions of the model is still 
rejected, indicating that the model is still not correctly specified. As we discussed 
previously, we suspect that the variables we are using as instruments to model the 
transmission channels, or at least some of them, are important for explaining the 
variation in output growth correlations. In addition, we suspect that there are other 
characteristics that may help to explain cross-country growth correlations.  
3.4  A General Model  
We now examine in more detail whether there are certain characteristics that if 
shared by two countries make it more likely that their growth rates will be 
correlated. Such common characteristics might make it easier for shocks to be 
transmitted between countries or simply make a pair of countries more susceptible 
to a particular type of common shock. The set of country characteristics that we 
consider include: common legal origins, accounting standards, the extent of 
structural economic reform, and a measure of the speed to adoption of information 
and communications technology (ICT). We consider the potential role of each of 
these variables in turn and then consider the empirical results. 
Origin of legal system 
The basis for trade in goods and financial assets is the existence and enforcement 
of property rights enforced through a country’s legal system. In a recent paper,  
La Porta et al (1998) argue that legal systems can differ quite markedly across 
countries in terms of the degree of legal protection given to agents engaged in 
commercial activity – particularly investment. The authors classify the legal 
systems of various countries into four categories – English, French, German and 
Scandinavian – based on the origin of the country’s legal system and laws. For 32 
 
example, in our sample of OECD countries, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand are classed as having legal systems that evolved from the English 
common-law tradition. 
We make two conjectures with respect to the legal origin variable. First, we 
suspect that countries with similar legal systems may have more integrated 
financial markets and institutions, over and above what is captured by the 
transmission channels previously considered. Thus, even controlling for these 
channels, parings of countries with similar legal origins will tend to more 
correlated business cycles. Second, legal systems may underlie different economic 
structures; as a consequence, we may observe different effects of common shocks, 
both the initial response as well as the propagation of these shocks, in countries 
with different legal systems. La Porta et al emphasise that different legal structures 
give rise to differences in corporate governance, particularly with respect to 
investor protection. They point to further research that suggests the quality of 
investor protection is related to the size of debt and equity markets, which we 
suspect may be important for the advent or propagation of financial sector shocks. 
Similarly, different legal structures may give rise to or be closely correlated with 
different forms of labour market organisation, something that may also underlie the 
advent or propagation of macroeconomic shocks. 
To pursue these ideas, we use data from La Porta et al to construct a set of dummy 
variables based upon country of legal origin. The most general is defined as 1 if  
a country pair shares a common legal origin and 0 otherwise. We also construct 
more specific pairings, for example 1 if both share Scandinavian legal origin and  
0 otherwise. We do this for each of the four possible origins. 
Accounting standards 
La Porta et al put accounting standards forward as an important aspect of corporate 
governance relating to investor protection, so for similar reasons discussed with 
respect to the country of legal origin variables, we also construct a bilateral index 
of accounting standards. We can also motivate the use of this variable as capturing 
the ability of countries to engage in international trade, in goods or financial assets. 
We conjecture that the higher the quality of accounting standards – capturing both 
the sophistication and transparency of accounting practices – the less costly it is for 
firms to engage in trade and investment overseas. 33 
 
La Porta et al present an index of the quality of accounting standards for a wide 
range of countries, including those we use in this study. We construct a bilateral 
index by taken the natural logarithm of the product of the two countries’ indices. 
The construction of the index in this way is relates to the second of the two 
motivations; that is, country pairs with a high index are more likely to be engaged 
in international transactions.26 We conjecture that the larger this bilateral index for 
any two countries, the more likely are their business cycles to be correlated. 
Index of structural economic reform  
A virus reached Australia in the early 1980s. It travelled from Britain to the USA 
and then to Australia. Anglo-Saxon societies appeared to be particularly prone to 
its impact, and in the South Pacific, New Zealand and Australia offered themselves 
as willing victims. The virus has a name: economic rationalism. (Daly 1993) 
Over the past twenty years, a number of countries in our sample have made 
considerable efforts to deregulate their economy, including the English-speaking 
economies identified by Daly (1993). Other countries, for example Italy, have 
undertaken much less deregulation. As well as leading to a convergence in the 
degree of the flexibility of economies, so that the effects of common shocks are 
likely to be similar, this process of deregulation may itself be a type of common 
shock to these economies. 
We construct a measure of the bilateral differences in the amount of structural 
economic reform between countries using a country index constructed by   
Lehmann Brothers and reported in The Economist (2001). On the basis of a large 
number of indicators, it rates countries on a scale of 0 to 10 on their structural 
economic policies (0, worst; 10, best). We use the distance between reforms in this 
instance because it serves best to capture the arguments above. Two countries that 
have pursued reforms are conjectured to be more likely to respond similarly to 
common shocks. For example, if we think that structural reforms have made 
countries more flexible, then they are likely to respond more quickly to external 
                                           
26   In this instance, we do not measure the distance between the quality of accounting standards 
for two countries. If only one country has well-designed and transparent accounting standards 
then this may be sufficient to promote greater integration between two countries. High quality 
accounting standards in one country may be able to compensate for relatively lower standards 
in the other country.  34 
 
shocks. Alternatively, if we think of these reforms as a source of shocks, then the 
index we construct in some sense captures the similarity of the shocks that any two 
countries have faced. In both of these cases, we expect a negative relationship 
between the distance between reform policies and the correlation of the business 
cycles. 
Openness to new technology  
It was only in the 1990’s that diffusion of the Internet and the WWW, accelerated 
falls in ICT prices and the emergence of user-friendly computer software allowed 
technologies to interact on an unprecedented scale, and allowed ordinary people 
and small businesses to use them productively.  
If a new industrial revolution really has begun, it will survive any cyclical collapse 
in the US economy. And with Australia one of the world’s top investors in IC 
technology, the revolution should soon spread down under. If it does, we’re in for 
a fast but rocky ride. (Gittins 2001)  
The development and use of new technology is one potential source of business 
cycle fluctuations. From a supply side perspective, new technologies can 
contribute to better means of production, generating an expansion in investment, 
employment, and output. New technologies may also be an important source of 
cyclical behaviour through their effects on financial markets. Fisher (1933) in his 
discussion of the stock market boom leading up to 1929 identifies inventions and 
new technologies as principal underlying forces. Similar arguments can be applied 
to the technology driven stock market bubble of the late 1990s. 
To investigate this, we construct a measure of the speed with which the economies 
in our sample adopted recent innovations in ICT, namely mobile phones, personal 
computers and the Internet. Essentially, we look at the degree of penetration of 
these technologies for each country in our sample around 1995–1996. 
This measure can in principle capture two possible contributions to the behaviour 
of economic growth. The first is the actual impact of ICT on productivity and 
output growth in those countries that were early adopters of these technologies. 
The influence of this on bilateral growth correlations, however, will be restricted to 
the 1990s at best. Alternatively, and this is what we hope to capture, this measure 35 
 
serves as a proxy for the general willingness (or ability) of countries to adopt new 
technologies  per se. For reasons similar to those discussed for the structural 
economic reform index, we construct the bilateral index as a distance measure and 
we again anticipate that the measure will be inversely related to the correlation of 
output growth.27 
Results  
In Table 5 we found evidence that suggested integration of stock markets and 
coordination of monetary policy were channels – additional to trade in goods – by 
which shocks could be transmitted between countries. To conclude our empirical 
work we report results obtained from augmenting the model in column (7) in   
Table 5 with the various characteristics. In addition to the characteristics discussed 
above we also include a dummy variable for adjacency of countries and an index 
of common language (see Frankel and Rose (1998)). So far we have used these 
variables as instruments, however, we now include them directly in the structural 
model. A common language may promote economic integration by influencing the 
level of communication and flow of ideas between countries, while adjacency may 
pick-up common historical ties between particular countries. 28 
Results from estimating the most general model are reported in Table 6. In   
column (1) we include all the characteristics and use the aggregate dummy variable 
for country of legal origin. It is apparent that a number of the variables in the 
general model are not significant, including: trade intensity; equity returns; 
industry structure; legal origin; structural reform and adjacency. If we retain trade 
intensity in the model but delete the other insignificant variables we obtain the 
results in column (2). This model suggests that in addition to the trade and 
                                           
27   Shleifer (1986) provides a slightly more sophisticated explanation for the role of technology 
in driving economic cycles. Firms with some degree of market power may choose to 
implement new technologies when economic growth is strong, ensuring that the size of the 
market and monopoly profits are larger. This leads to an exacerbation of the business cycle. 
Notice that this complicates the interpretation; underlying the explanation is some   
non-specified source of business cycle fluctuations which then receive additional impetus 
from the firms’ behaviour. 
28   The set of instruments is now: the natural logarithm of the distance between two countries; 
the bilateral index of the concentration of firm ownership; the geometric average of median 
incomes from 1980–2000. The first two are instruments used previously; median income, 
which is a standard instrument in gravity models of trade, is included as we wish to consider a 
number of previous instruments as explanatory variables. 36 
 
exchange rate channels, three characteristics are important in explaining output 
correlations: good accounting standards; common take-up of new technology and a 
common language. In fact the common language variable and the common legal 
origin variable seem to contain similar information. This can be seen from the 
results in column (3) where common language is replaced by common legal origin, 
with very little effect on the results. 
In columns (4) and (5) we allow for legal origin to have different effects depending 
upon where it derived from – English, French, German and Scandinavian. Deleting 
the insignificant variables (other than trade) gives the model under column (5). Of 
the four legal origin dummies only that for German is not significant. For pairs of 
countries with legal systems of English and French origin there is a positive effect 
on the output correlation, while possessing a system of Scandinavian origin acts to 
reduce the correlation for country pairs. Finally for this specification common 
language is not significant but adjacency is. 
As an additional check on the robustness of the results in Table 6 we examined 
whether foreign direct investment (FDI) might perform better than trade intensity 
in the general models. Recall that the results obtained from the more restricted 
models (see Tables 2 to 5) give some reason to think this might be the case. We 
tried two experiments. Initially we simply re-estimated all the models in Table 6 
with FDI in place of trade intensity. This produced results (not reported) that are 
very similar to the ones in Table 6. There is no evidence from the more general 
models that use of FDI rather than trade intensity markedly improves their 
performance. In the second experiment we included both FDI and trade intensity in 
each of the models in Table 6. While the high correlation between the two 
variables produces relatively low t-statistics, we find no evidence that FDI 
statistically dominates trade intensity. 
The results in Table 6 suggest that the following variables are jointly important for 
explaining bilateral output growth correlations: bilateral trade intensity; bilateral 
exchange rate volatility; accounting standards and speed of adoption of new 
information and communication technology. In addition various subsets of the 
following three variables: a common origin of the legal system; a common 
language and a common land border are found to be important. It is also evident 
from Table 6 that including the country characteristic variables into the model 
produces a considerably better fit of the data. For example, the best fitting model in  37 
 
Table 6: Trade, Financial Integration, Policy and Characteristics 
Dependent variable: bilateral GDP growth correlations 1980–2000 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5) 
Constant –12.9077  –7.4251  –8.6339  –17.6592  –10.2529 
  (–2.6278) (–2.2398) (–2.5477) (–3.6279) (–3.0471)
Trade intensity: total  0.0803  0.1006  0.0881  0.0461  0.0756 
  (0.8593) (1.7311) (1.4214) (0.5066) (1.3334)
Share return spreads  0.5357      0.4882   
 (1.1642)      (1.1574)   
Exchange  rate  deviations  –0.3230 –0.2516  –0.2741 –0.4590 –0.2607 
  (–1.3267) (–1.8416) (–1.9570) (–1.8297) (–1.6872)
        
        
Total industry structure  –0.1771      –0.3663   
 (–0.2610)      (–0.5639)   
Country of legal origin: English        0.4280  0.3945 
       (1.2250)  (2.3354)
Country of legal origin: French        0.5505  0.4971 
       (3.1641)  (3.9151)
Country of legal origin: German        0.1125   
       (0.4791)   
Country of legal origin: 
Scandinavian 
     –0.6751  –0.5765 
       (–1.9781)  (–2.2501)
Country of legal origin: all  0.0731    0.2379     
  (0.3807)   (2.0886)    
Accounting  standards  1.3197 0.9235  1.0469 1.8307 1.2382 
  (2.8772) (2.6955) (3.0074) (3.9994) (3.5733)
Structural reform  0.1418      0.1974   
 (1.1788)      (1.6414)   
Technology  take-up  –0.8570 –0.9134  –0.8021 –0.8808 –0.8684 
  (–3.7580) (–4.3047) (–3.6317) (–3.7581) (–4.0648)
Adjacency 0.1099      0.2860  0.3191 
 (0.4888)      (1.3104)  (1.7668)
Linguistic 0.5259  0.3586    0.1988   
 (1.8906)  (2.9177)   (0.7397)   
OI  restrictions  – 0.459  0.096 – 0.196 












DWH  0.432 0.896  0.986 0.657 0.942 
Correlation  0.569 0.572  0.563 0.624 0.622 
Sigma  0.482 0.471  0.476 0.450 0.442 
Notes:  As for Table 5. Equations (1) and (4) are exactly identified. 
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Table 5 had a correlation between predicted and actual of 0.39, while those in 
Table 6 have numbers around 0.6. It is also the case that over-identifying 
restrictions are not rejected for models (2), (3) and (5) in Table 6. 
One question that arises from these results is exactly how we should interpret the 
role played by the characteristic variables. One view, that is consistent with how 
we initially motivated the inclusion of these variables, is that they capture the 
extent to which pairs of countries might be susceptible to common shocks. Under 
this interpretation, the models in Table 6 explain bilateral output growth 
correlations as arising from both shock transmissions between countries via trade 
and monetary policy, and common shocks. There are other interpretations, 
however. It is possible that the characteristic variables capture interactions between 
economies that are not directly picked up by the existing transmission channel 
variables. In particular, an important way in which countries interact is via the 
interchange of ideas, information and beliefs. We have no direct measure of the 
importance of such information flows. Perhaps variables like common language, 
common land border and common legal systems act, in part at least, as proxies for 
unmeasured communication among countries. Finally it is also possible that our 
measures of particular transmission channels such as trade in goods are less than 
perfect and this is captured by the country characteristics.  
3.4.1 Further  analysis 
It is apparent from the results in Table 6 that we have been able to identify a 
number of statistically significant variables that help to explain the cross-section 
variation in output growth correlations among OECD nations. However what is not 
apparent from the regression equations is exactly how well (or badly) these models 
do in fitting the observed correlation for a particular pair of countries. In particular, 
one thing of interest is the ability of the estimated models to explain the relatively 
high pair-wise correlations among the English-speaking countries. To address 
these issues, we report in Table 7 the actual and predicted correlations for all pairs 
of countries in our sample. The predicted values are obtained from the model in 
column (3) of Table 6 that includes; trade, exchange rate deviations, (aggregated) 
country of legal origin, accounting standards and technology take-up. We prefer 
this model since it does not include any variable that acts like a dummy variable 
for the English-speaking countries. In Table 7 shading indicates the ten pairings for 
the five English-speaking countries.  39 
 
Table 7: Predicted and Actual GDP Growth Correlations 1980–2000 
Table 6 model (3) 
Country pair  Actual  Predicted  Country pair Actual Predicted Country pair   Actual  Predicted
GB: US  0.56  0.43  CH: US  0.35  0.28  FI: JP  0.19  0.18 
AT: US  –0.02  0.02  CH: GB  0.04  0.39  ES: US  0.30  0.07 
AT: GB  0.12  0.22  CH: AT  0.35  0.34  ES: GB  0.48  0.29 
DK: US  0.17  0.28  CH: DK  –0.15  0.32  ES: AT  0.53  0.19 
DK: GB  0.15  0.33  CH: FR  0.49  0.31  ES: DK  –0.03  0.09 
DK: AT  –0.05  0.16  CH: DE  0.48  0.46  ES: FR  0.75  0.52 
FR: US  0.19  0.11  CH: IT  0.68  0.25  ES: DE  0.61  0.32 
FR: GB  0.39  0.33  CH: NL  0.55  0.34  ES: IT  0.53  0.41 
FR: AT  0.51  0.35  CH: NO  0.16  0.29  ES: NL  0.57  0.37 
FR: DK  –0.10  0.30  CH: SE  0.36  0.37  ES: NO  –0.08  0.12 
DE: US  0.20  0.11  CA: US  0.85  0.59  ES: SE  0.54  0.21 
DE: GB  0.08  0.33  CA: GB  0.54  0.51  ES: CH  0.34  0.15 
DE: AT  0.61  0.71  CA: AT  –0.03  0.09  ES: CA  0.32  0.11 
DE: DK  0.01  0.35  CA: DK  0.09  0.16  ES: JP  0.28  0.18 
DE: FR  0.50  0.45  CA: FR  0.25  0.20  ES: FI  0.29  0.17 
IT: US  0.33  0.09  CA: DE  0.12  0.20  AU: US  0.66  0.53 
IT: GB  0.34  0.31  CA: IT  0.52  0.18  AU: GB  0.37  0.40 
IT: AT  0.39  0.29  CA: NL  0.52  0.23  AU: AT  –0.08  –0.10 
IT: DK  –0.02  0.16  CA: NO  0.30  0.28  AU: DK  0.05  0.17 
IT: FR  0.61  0.47  CA: SE  0.45  0.32  AU: FR  0.23  0.05 
IT: DE  0.52  0.37  CA: CH  0.49  0.24  AU: DE  –0.02  0.07 
NL: US  0.57  0.19  JP: US  –0.07  0.14  AU: IT  0.34  0.05 
NL: GB  0.30  0.40  JP: GB  0.07  0.27  AU: NL  0.39  0.07 
NL: AT  0.51  0.46  JP: AT  0.18  0.29  AU: NO  0.17  0.31 
NL: DK  0.20  0.34  JP: DK  –0.37  0.08  AU: SE  0.34  0.35 
NL: FR  0.43  0.53  JP: FR  0.28  0.24  AU: CH  0.43  0.17 
NL: DE  0.66  0.58  JP: DE  0.38  0.37  AU: CA  0.72  0.43 
NL: IT  0.49  0.42  JP: IT  0.32  0.20  AU: JP  –0.07  0.16 
NO: US  0.26  0.42  JP: NL  0.04  0.23  AU: FI  0.41  0.31 
NO: GB  0.11  0.43  JP: NO  –0.22  0.13  AU: ES  0.21  –0.05 
NO: AT  0.06  0.06  JP: SE  0.12  0.21  NZ: US  0.35  0.47 
NO: DK  0.49  0.48  JP: CH  0.32  0.30  NZ: GB  0.22  0.45 
NO: FR  –0.26  0.24  JP: CA  –0.03  0.26  NZ: AT  –0.28  –0.09 
NO: DE  0.14  0.26  FI: US  0.30  0.38  NZ: DK  0.31  0.19 
NO: IT  0.30  0.17  FI: GB  0.48  0.44  NZ: FR  –0.17  0.09 
NO: NL  0.31  0.28  FI: AT  –0.10  0.12  NZ: DE  –0.29  0.11 
SE: US  0.37  0.42  FI: DK  0.02  0.49  NZ: IT  0.00  0.07 
SE: GB  0.57  0.47  FI: FR  0.42  0.26  NZ: NL  0.12  0.12 
SE: AT  0.25  0.15  FI: DE  –0.11  0.29  NZ: NO  0.40  0.22 
SE: DK  0.28  0.54  FI: IT  0.40  0.23  NZ: SE  0.18  0.35 
SE: FR  0.54  0.28  FI: NL  0.12  0.30  NZ: CH  0.00  0.20 
SE: DE  0.26  0.31  FI: NO  0.07  0.54  NZ: CA  0.38  0.38 
SE: IT  0.62  0.28  FI: SE  0.66  0.65  NZ: JP  –0.23  0.19 
SE: NL  0.33  0.32  FI: CH  0.39  0.36  NZ: FI  0.24  0.28 
SE: NO  0.27  0.60  FI: CA  0.48  0.28  NZ: ES  –0.22  –0.01 
           NZ: AU  0.50  0.52 
Notes:  Predicted values are from model (3) in Table 6 after transformation to correlations as described in 
Appendix A. Shaded cells are English-speaking country pairs. 40 
 
It is apparent from Table 7 that the model has difficulty in fitting the negative 
correlations in the data. This is mainly a problem for pairings with Japan and   
New Zealand. The most likely explanation for the high frequency of low and 
negative bilateral correlations observed for these two countries is that they have 
been affected by idiosyncratic shocks that have not been transmitted, either directly 
or indirectly, to the other countries in our sample. At least for New Zealand, the 
lack of transmission of home grown shocks from this small economy is certainly 
consistent with our prior expectation.  
Turning to the English-speaking economies, the model does best at fitting the 
correlations for New Zealand and Australia, New Zealand and Canada, UK and 
Canada, and UK and Australia. It does worst at fitting Canada and Australia.   
In general the model under-predicts the degree of correlation among the   
English-speaking countries. The only exception to this is for New Zealand, which 
the model implies should be more highly correlated with both the US and the UK. 
Again this may be a reflection of idiosyncratic shocks in New Zealand.  
In the case of Australia and the US our model predicts a correlation of 0.53 
compared with the actual value 0.66. To get an indication of how the explanatory 
variables in our model contribute to the predicted correlation we employ a simple 
decomposition. Consider the following estimated model where the variables are 
written in terms of deviations from their means. 
  11 1 12 2 ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) ii i yy xx x x ββ −= − + −  (6) 
If we sequentially set all the explanatory variables except one equal to their 
respective means, then we can identify the individual contribution of each variable 
to the predicted value of y (relative to its mean value). In our case we have to apply 
the transformation in Appendix A, but using the above idea we can identify how 
each of the variables contributes to the predicted US–Australian correlation of 
0.53.  
Table 8 reports the results of this decomposition. If all of the US–Australian 
observations for trade intensity, exchange rate deviations, (aggregated) country of 
legal origin, accounting standards and technology take-up were equal to the sample 
means for these variables we would expect a bilateral output growth correlation of 
0.29. Thus the five variables in the model contribute a total of 0.24 to the predicted 41 
 
correlation. Reading across Table 8 indicates the individual contribution of each of 
the variables to explaining the predicted US–Australian growth correlation. 
The intensity of trade between Australia and the US make a relatively small 
positive contribution (0.04) to the correlation. This supports the widely accepted 
view that bilateral trade in goods between Australia and the US is not the full story 
in explaining the observed correlation between these countries. By way of 
comparison, the predicted correlation for Canada and the US is 0.59, which is 0.30 
larger than the mean correlation across all country pairs of 0.29. Of this, about 0.12 
is contributed by trade intensity (again based on column (3) of Table 6).  
Table 8: Contributions to Predicted Australian–US Output Growth 
Correlation 











y yi − ˆ  
 
Contribution   0.04  –0.02  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.24 
Percentage   17  –8   33   25  33   100 
Notes:  Contributions are based upon the coefficient estimates from Table 6 model (3). They indicate how much 
each variable contributes to the predicted Australian–US correlation (less the estimated mean correlation). 
The second row reports the contribution in percentage terms. Contributions are calculated after
transforming the correlations as described in Appendix A. Note that the estimated mean correlation (0.29) 
differs slightly from the sample mean for the data, 0.27; this arises because of the non-linear 
transformation used in estimation. 
 
Now consider the effect of bilateral exchange rate volatility for Australia and the 
US. This has actually acted to reduce the correlation in growth rates by 0.02. Again 
it is interesting to consider the Canada–US results. In this case the relatively low 
bilateral exchange rate volatility between the two countries contributes 0.08 
towards their observed correlation.  
According to Table 8 the explanation for the high Australian–US growth 
correlation primarily lies with the characteristics and institutions that the two 
countries share. The existence of legal systems with a common English origin in 
Australia and the US adds a predicted 0.08 to the two countries output growth 
correlation. A similar contribution is obtained from the technology take-up 
variable. Our indicator of the speed of adoption of new ICT gives Australia and the 
US equal scores. The index of joint accounting standards for Australia and the US 42 
 
contributes 0.06. In aggregate these three variables contribute 0.22 (out of 0.24) to 
the predicted Australian–US output growth correlation.  
Before concluding it is useful to consider what our empirical model suggests about 
the likely magnitude of the Australia–US output growth correlation in the future. 
In particular, are we likely to see a continuation of the high positive correlation of 
the past twenty years? According to the model two things that would make 
Australia more susceptible to shocks of US origin and tend to raise the degree of 
output correlation are increased bilateral trade and lower volatility of the 
USD/AUD exchange rate. At present however significant changes in these 
variables (in the required directions) seem unlikely.  
More important for explaining the strong Australia–US growth correlation are the 
characteristic or institutional variables. While the nature of these variables is such 
that they are unlikely to undergo rapid changes, their expected future contribution 
to the Australian–US correlation depends on the reason for their current 
significance. If the characteristic variables actually measure the susceptibility of 
the Australian and US economies to similar types of economic shocks then most of 
the recent strong Australian–US output growth correlation is due to common 
shocks. Consequently whether this strong correlation will continue depends on the 
relative importance of common verses country-specific shocks in driving each 
country’s output. It is certainly consistent with our results to argue that if either 
Australia or the US were to be hit by a sequence of large idiosyncratic shocks then 
the observed output correlation between the two countries could fall to near the 
OECD average.  
Alternatively however, the significance of the characteristic variables in our model 
may reflect the omission of important transmission channels between pairs of 
countries. Under these circumstances the majority of the Australian–US output 
correlation is likely to be due to the transmission of non-trade and non-monetary 
policy shocks from the US to Australia. In these circumstances there is little reason 
to expect the existing degree of correlation between Australian and US output 
growth rates to fall in the future.  43 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have identified a number of variables that can explain bilateral 
growth correlations among a sample of OECD countries. Consistent with earlier 
work by Frankel and Rose we generally find a significant role for bilateral trade in 
goods, with higher bilateral trading intensities associated with higher output 
growth correlations. The volatility of bilateral exchange rates is also found to be 
significant with lower bilateral exchange rate volatility associated with higher 
correlations.  
In addition to these two transmission mechanism variables we find significant 
effects on output growth correlations from variables that measure certain 
characteristics or institutional features of economies. In particular, good accounting 
standards, similar legal systems, common language and openness to new 
technology are important factors. Unfortunately we are not able to determine the 
exact role played by these characteristic variables. It seems likely that either they 
make it easier for shocks to be transmitted between countries or they cause a pair 
of countries to be more susceptible to a similar type of shock.  
Also worthy of note are variables that are not found to be significant factors in 
explaining bilateral growth correlations. These include: the similarity of monetary 
policy in the two countries (as measured by the volatility of the spread between 
two countries’ short-term real interest rates); the extent of integration of long-term 
bond markets; common industry structure and differences in structural reform. 
While some of these variables are individually significant they typically do not 
survive in a multivariate regression framework. The lack of significance of 
industry structure in our general model is a particularly interesting finding in light 
of the strong effects reported by Imbs (2000).  
Our empirical results can be used to help understand the nature of the strong 
correlation between Australian and US output growth over the last twenty years. 
Using our preferred model we can explain about 80 per cent of the actual 
Australian–US correlation of 0.66. In our view this is an impressive result 
particularly given that our model was designed to fit bilateral correlations across 
17 OECD countries. According to our results, the high correlation between 
Australia and the US is probably not due to the direct transmission of shocks from 
the US to Australia, via trade or financial markets or through coordinated monetary 44 
 
policies. Overwhelmingly the results in this paper suggest that it is the presence of 
common characteristics and institutions in Australia and the US that primarily 
explains the high correlation. Why exactly these characteristics and institutions 
help to explain output growth correlations between countries remains an open 
question. It may be that countries with similar characteristics respond similarly to 
common shocks. Alternatively, there may more subtle transmission channels at 
work – perhaps the transmission of ideas, including the effects on output of a 
similar approach to the take-up of new technologies. 45 
 
Appendix A: The Transformation of the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, the sample correlation of GDP growth, must lie between  
–1 and 1. However this implies that the error term in Equation (1) cannot be 
normally distributed. This issue has not been addressed in previous papers using 
these types of models (Frankel and Rose 1998; Imbs 2000), presumably under the 
assumption that the variance of the error term is sufficiently small; however, our 
results suggest that the variance of the error term is not very small and it is 
necessary to take account of this restriction. 
To do so, we assume that there is a function () f ⋅ that transforms the linear 
regression model so that it satisfies this constraint. That is, we rewrite the model 
as: 
  ,, , () ij ij ij fW ττ τ ρβ ε =+  (A1) 
Here,  , ij τ ρ  is the correlation measure for countries i and j for time period τ ,  , ij W τ  is 
a set of regressors of the general model, and  , ij τ ε  is the error term. The function 














As w gets very large (small),  () f w  gets closer to 1 (-1); and  (0) 0 f = . To estimate 













To recover the predicted correlation values from the model, we apply the function 
() f w  to the predicted values of the estimated model.  46 
 
Appendix B: Data 
We consider 17 OECD countries; these and their associated two-digit ISO codes 
are listed in Table B1. These countries are selected on the basis of data availability 
across all of the various bilateral variables we consider. 
Output 
Table B1: Data Sources for Output 
Country  ISO code  Quarterly real GDP 
Australia  AU  ABS National Accounts Cat No 5206.0, Table 5 
Austria AT  OEOCGVOLG 
Canada CA  CNGDP…D;  CNI99BVRG 
Denmark DK  DKOCGVOLG 
Finland FI  FNI99BVPH 
France FR  FRGDP…D;  FROCGVOLG 
Germany DE  WGGDP…D 
Italy IT  ITGDP…D;  ITI99BVRG 
Japan JP  JPGDP…D;  SNA68 
Netherlands NL NLGDO…D;  NLOCGVOLG 
New Zealand  NZ  NZGDP…D; RBNZ 
Norway NO  NWI99BVPH 
Spain ES  ESGDP…D;  ESOCGVOLG 
Sweden SE  SDI99BVPH 
Switzerland CH SWOCGVOLG 
United Kingdom  GB  UKABMI 
United States  US  USGDP…D 
Notes:  Unless otherwise indicated, codes are for Datastream. Where two sources of data are indicated it is 
because we do not have an historical series over the 1960–2000 period; series from the two sources 
are spliced. Some series are not available seasonally adjusted for a substantial portion of
the sample; for these series, we use a simple moving average filter as described in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). 
 
We use quarterly real GDP data to construct four-quarter-ended growth rates 
(constructed as log fourth differences). The sources for the quarterly GDP data are 
given in Table B1. To calculate the correlations for the various samples discussed 
in the text, it is necessary in some instances to take account of the fact that we do 
not have data for all quarters of the sample. This arises because of limited data, 47 
 
particularly for the earlier years, and also because we use a moving average filter 
to seasonally adjust some of the series. Where there is missing data, we exclude 
those observations from the calculation of the bilateral correlations only on a pair 
wise basis; in other words, for each bilateral correlation, we use the maximum data 
available. 
Bilateral trade in goods and services 
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Where  ijt X  is total nominal exports from country i to country j in period t,  ijt M is 
total nominal imports of country i from country j in period t, and  it Y  is nominal 
GDP for country i in period t. All series are measured in USD. 
The bilateral trade flows data are from the IMF International Direction of Trade 
Statistics. For the period 1960–1993, we use the annual data collected by Frankel 
and Rose (1998) available at <URL:http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/group/eap/>. 
For the 1993–2000 period, we use the monthly IMF International Direction of 
Trade Statistics available on Datastream. The monthly data are aggregated to 
annual data. All series are reported in USD. 
Nominal annual GDP is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook,  
December 2000. The data are converted to USD using year averages of quarterly 
nominal USD exchange rates for each country. The exchange rate data are from the 
IMF  International Financial Statistics available on Datastream; the codes are 






















Australia  AUOCFGPN AUOCFGDP  AUOCPCONF AUI61…  AUOCFIST AUOCSPRC  AUI..RF. 
Austria OEOCFGPN  OEOCFGDP  OEOCPCONF OEOCLTIR  OEOCFIST  OEI62...F  OEI..RF. 
Canada CNOCFGPN  CNOCFGDP  CNOCPCONF CNOCLNG%  CNOCFIST  CNOCSPRC  CNI..RF. 
Denmark  DKOCFGPN DKOCFGDP DKOCCPNIF DKOCLTIR  DKOCFIST DKOCSPRC  DKI..RF. 
Finland  FNOCFGPN FNOCFGDP  FNOCPCONF FNOCLNG% FNOCFIST FNOCSPRC  FNI..RF. 
France  FROCFGPN FROCFGDP  FROCPCONF FROCBYG% FROCFIST FROCSPRC  FRI..RF. 
Germany WGGDP…B  WGGDP...D  WGCP....F  BDOCLNG%R  BDOCFIST  BDOCSPRC  BDI..RF. 
Italy ITOCFGPN  ITOCFGDP  ITOCPCONF  ITOCLNG%  ITOCFIST  ITI62...F  ITI..RF. 
Japan JPOCFGPN  JPOCFGDP  JPOCPCONF  JPOCLNG%  JPOCFIST  JPOCSPRC  JPI..RF. 
Netherlands  NLOCFGPN NLOCFGDP  NLI64...F  NLI61...  NLOCFIST NLOCSPRC  NLI..RF. 
New Zealand  NZOCFGPN  NZOCFGDP  NZOCPCONF NZOCLNG%  NZOCFIST  NZI62...F  NZI..RF. 
Norway NWOCFGPN  NWOCFGDP  NWOCPCONF NWI61...  NWOCFIST  NWI62...F  NWI..RF. 
Spain ESOCFGPN  ESOCFGDP  ESOCPCONF  ESI61...  ESOCFIST  ESOCSPRC  ESI..RF. 
Sweden  SDOCFGPN SDOCFGDP  SDOCPCONF SDOCLNGY SDOCFIST SDOCSPRC  SDI..RF. 
Switzerland SWOCFGPN  SWOCFGDP  SWOCPCONF SWOCLNG%  SWOCFIST  SWOCSPRC  SWI..RF. 
United  Kingdom  UKOCFGPN UKOCFGDP  UKOCPCONF UKOCLNG% UKOCFIST UKOCSPRC  UKI..RF. 
United States  USOCFGPN  USOCFGDP  USOCPCONF USOCLNG%  USOCFIST  USI62...F  na 
Notes:  All series are from Datastream. From 1999, EMU exchange rate data is used for the relevant European countries (code: EMI..RF.)  
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Bilateral foreign direct investment positions 
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Where  ijt FI  is the inward forward investment position in year t of country i from 
country j;  ijt FO is the outward foreign investment position in year t for country i in 
country j. As before,  it Y  is nominal GDP for country i in period t and all series are 
measured in USD. The foreign investment positions are taken from OECD Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook 1999. In most instances, the foreign investment 
series are reported in local currencies; these are converted to USD using the 
exchange rate series discussed above. 
In theory the numerators of the two indices should be the same, however because 
they are obtained (by the OECD) from different statistical agencies there can be 
discrepancies between the figures. By taking the maximum we get a measure of the 
greatest degree of exposure that two countries might have with each other; it is also 
consistent with the measure of bilateral trade intensities discussed above. 
Real interest rates 
To calculate real interest rates, we use quarterly nominal interest rates and 
quarterly consumer price indices. From these, we calculate year average interest 
rates and price levels. Real interest rates are calculated as an ex post measure: 
  ,, , 1, , 100 ( )/ it it it it it ri P PP + =− × −  (B3) 
Where  it i  is the nominal year average interest rate and  it P  is the year average 
consumer price index. For long interest rates, we use long-term government bonds 
(usually of 10-year maturity). For short interest rates, we use short-term rates 
(usually of 3-month maturity). For the price level, we use consumer price indices. 
All series are available on Datastream. The bilateral series used in estimation, for 50 
 
both short and long rates, is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the 
real interest rate spread: 
  , ln ( ) ij it jt rs r r τ σ =−  (B4) 
Real equity returns 
To calculate real equity returns we use monthly nominal stock market indices and 
quarterly consumer price indices. From these, we calculate year average levels and 














=  (B5) 
Where  it S  is the value of the stock index in country i in year t and  it P  is the 
consumer price index described above. The stock market indices are monthly and 
taken, via Datastream, from either the OECD Economic Outlook or IMF 
International Financial Statistics. The bilateral series used in estimation is the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the spread on real equity return: 
  , ln ( ) ij it jt es s s τ σ =−  (B6) 
Exchange rate volatility 
We use the standard deviation of the quarterly difference, in logarithms, of the 
nominal bilateral exchange rates. The data is from Datastream; the codes are 
identified in Table B2. 
Bilateral characteristic variables 
We use a number of variables in the empirical models, either as instruments or 
regressors, which are based upon specific economic or geographic characteristics. 
The variables typically measure whether or not two countries share a particular 
characteristic. These variables can be grouped as follows: geographic and 
language, economic size, industry structure, corporate governance, structural 
economic reform, and the take-up of new technology. 51 
 
Table B3: Adjacency and Linguistic Dummy Variables 
Upper triangle: adjacency dummy 
Lower triangle: common language dummy 
  US GB AT DK FR DE  IT  NL NO SE CH CA JP  FI  ES AU NZ
US    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
GB 1    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AT 0 0    0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DK 0 0 0    0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FR 0 0 0 0    1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
DE 0 0 1 0 0    0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IT  0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CH 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1    0 0 0 0 0 
JP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 
FI  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 
ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 
AU 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0    0 
NZ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1   
Source:  Frankel and Rose (1998) 
 
Geographic and language variables 
The geographic and language variables we use are bilateral distance, adjacency, 
and language; these are taken from Frankel and Rose (1998). The adjacency and 
linguistic dummies are reported in Table B3; the bilateral distance measure is 
reported in Table B4. 
Economic size 
To measure economic size, we use median nominal annual GDP measured in USD 
for the period 1980–2000. These are constructed from the nominal GDP series 
identified in Table B2 and converted to USD using the exchange rate series 
identified in Table B2. For any two countries, we use the natural logarithm of the 





Table B4: Bilateral Distance 
  US  GB  AT  DK  FR DE IT NL  NO SE  CH  CA  JP  FI  ES  AU  NZ 
U S                            
GB  6  360                         
AT  7  548  1  236                        
DK  6  847  957  870                       
FR  6 655  341  1 035  1 028                           
DE  6  839  511  727  659  400                     
IT  7 747  1 434  765  1 532  1 108  1 066                       
NL  6  616  358 935 622 428 235  1  295                     
NO  6 505  1 155  1 354  485  1 343  1 048  2 009  916                   
SE  6 885  1 433  1 244  523  1 544  1 182  1 978  1 127  416                 
CH  7 057  748  802  1 145  414  509  696  690  1 556  1 661               
CA  1 037  5 368  6 574  5 913  5 653  5 857  6 735  5 639  5 604  5 999  6 049            
JP  10 142  9 570  9 140  8 700  9 723  9 356  9 867  9 300  8 414  8 179  9 803 10 327           
FI  7 134  1 824  1 442  885  1 911  1 532  2 204  1 505  789  399  1 982 6 279  7 827        
ES  6 733  1 265  1 810  2 075  1 055  1 421  1 363  1 483  2 392  2 596  1 025 5 698  10 775 2 953      
AU  14 891  17 010  15 992  16 056  16 978 16 585  16 338 16 659  15 965  15 613 16 788 15 880  7 835 15 214 17 700    
NZ  13 463  18 834  18 171  17 977  19 005 18 620  18 562 18 585  17 689  17 461 18 970 14 498  9 285 17 094 19 871 2 229  
Note:  Distance is between the business centres of the relevant countries measured in kilometres. 




This is a measure of the difference between the industry structures of two 
economies and is based on Imbs (2000); it follows from previous work by 
Krugman (1991). The index is constructed as follows: 
  ,, ,
1
M




=−   (B7) 
The variable  , ik t l denotes employment in sector k as a share of total employment in 
country i. M is the number of sectors and t is the period for which the index is 
computed. For the empirical work in this paper, we use 1989 data disaggregated to 
the one digit sector level, which corresponds to the middle of the 1980–2000 
sample. The data is from the OECD Labour Force Statistics, various issues.  
Corporate governance 
We use three variables related to corporate governance taken from   
La Porta et al (1998). These are country of legal origin, accounting standards and 
firm ownership concentration. The first identifies the origin of the legal system 
used by a particularly country; there are four possible groups: English, French, 
German and Scandinavian. Accounting standards rates each country’s accounting 
standards on a scale of 0–100, with high values indicating good quality accounting 
standards. Firm ownership measures the concentration of ownership of the top ten 
non-financial firms for each country. These variables are reported in Table B5. 
For country of legal origin, we construct a dummy variable that is 1 if a country 
pair shares a common country of legal origin and 0 otherwise. There are 28 such 
pairs. We also construct dummy variables specific to each possible origin. For 
accounting standards, we use as an index the natural logarithm of the product of 
the two countries accounting standards. We use a similar bilateral index for firm 
ownership concentration. 
Structural economic reform 
The structural economic reform bilateral index is constructed from an index 
prepared by Lehmann Brothers and reported in The Economist (2001). On the basis 54 
 
of a large number of indicators, it rates countries on a scale of 0 to 10 on their 
structural economic policies (0, worst; 10, best). The measure of structural 
economic reform for each country is reported in Table B5. The bilateral index is 
constructed as the natural logarithm of the product of the measures for each 
country. 











United States  English 71  0.12  6.50 
United Kingdom  English 78  0.15  5.81 
Austria  German 54 0.51  4.50 
Denmark  Scandinavian 62  0.40  4.81 
France  French 69  0.24  4.69 
Germany  German 62 0.50  4.69 
Italy  French 62  0.60  4.25 
Netherlands  French 64  0.31  5.00 
Norway  Scandinavian 74  0.31  4.69 
Sweden  Scandinavian 83  0.28  5.31 
Switzerland  German 68 0.48  5.19 
Canada  English 74  0.24  5.88 
Japan  German 65 0.13  4.81 
Finland  Scandinavian 77  0.34  5.13 
Spain  French 64  0.50  4.50 
Australia  English 75  0.28  5.38 
New Zealand  English 70  0.51  5.88 
Notes:  Country of legal origin, accounting standards and firm ownership are taken from La Porta et al (1998). 
Structural economic reform is from The Economist (2001). 
 
Technology adoption 
This measures the speed with which a country adopts new technology. We use  
data on the following three new technologies: mobile phones – number per   
1 000 people in 1995; personal computers – number per 1 000 people in 1995 and 
Internet hosts – number per 10 000 people in 1996. Data on these variables are 
taken from the World Bank Social Indicators. Countries are ranked according to 
their adoption of each of the new technologies: those in the top third receive a 55 
 
score of 3, those in the middle third a score of 2 and those in the lowest third a 
score of 1. The scores are then added across the three technologies to give a total 
score out of 9. These are reported in Table B6. 
An index of difference in speed of adoption is then constructed by taking the 
absolute difference between the scores of two economies divided by nine. This 
index then describes how similar two countries are in their adoption of technology. 

































United  States 128.40 3  328.00 3  313.16  3  9 
United  Kingdom  98.00 2  186.20 2  99.01  2  6 
Austria  47.60 1  124.20 1  88.27  2  4 
Denmark  157.30 3  270.50 3  147.20  2  8 
France  23.80 1  134.30 1  32.69  1  3 
Germany  42.80 1  164.90 2  66.96  1  4 
Italy  67.40 2  83.70 1  19.97  1  4 
Netherlands  33.20 1  200.50 2  138.88  2  5 
Norway  224.40 3  273.00 3  277.46  3  9 
Sweden  229.40 3  192.50 2  211.02  3  8 
Switzerland  63.50 2  348.00 3  145.87  2  7 
Canada  86.50 2  192.50 2  143.33  2  6 
Japan  81.50 2  152.50 1  39.65  1  4 
Finland  199.20 3  182.10 2  542.69  3  8 
Spain  24.10 1  81.60 1  15.93  1  3 
Australia  127.70 3  275.80 3  220.15  3  9 
New  Zealand 108.00 2  222.70 3  216.81  3  8 
Notes:  The data are from the World Bank Social Indicators. For each category, ranking is structured as:
top 6 = 3; middle 6 = 2; bottom 5 = 1. 56 
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